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Abstract
Mark Changizi et al. (2008) claim that it is possible systematically to organize more than 50 kinds
of illusions in a 7 · 4 matrix of 28 classes. This systematization, they further maintain, can be
explained by the operation of a single visual processing latency correction mechanism that they call
‘‘perceiving the present’’ (PTP). This brief report raises some concerns about the way a number of
illusions are classified by the proposed systematization. It also poses two general problems—one
empirical and one conceptual—for the PTP approach.
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1. Introduction
The proverbial fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. When it
comes to visual illusions, traditional researchers tend to be foxes. They tend to accept what
Coren, Girgus, and Day (1973) describe as ‘‘the nonparsimonious and esthetically ugly posi-
tion’’ that visual illusions are ‘‘multiply caused and maintained by a number of different
peripheral and central factors’’ (p. 504). Efforts to taxonomize, that is, systematically clas-
sify, visual illusions, must comport with this constraint.1
Mark Changizi and co-authors have recently made an ambitious and unprecedented
case in this journal for what might be called the hedgehog’s point of view (Changizi,
Hsieh, Nijhawan, Kanai, & Shimojo, 2008). Not only do they argue that it is possible to
organize more than 50 seemingly disparate kinds of visual illusions in a 7 · 4 matrix of
28 illusion classes, they also hypothesize that a single visual information processing
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mechanism may adequately explain all of the illusions taxonomized by their scheme. The
bold and undeniably original theory that they put forward is summarized by the following
six claims:
I. The human visual system compensates for the visual processing latency (VPL)
between proximal stimulation and perceptual awareness during forward locomotion
by predictively generating a conscious perception of the next probable scene. Latency
correction mechanisms make it possible for moving observers to perceive the present
instead of the recent past.
II. Certain stimulus features are statistically correlated with a moving observer’s direc-
tion of motion (DoM). A region of the visual field near the DoM will tend to have the
following: (1) smaller angular sizes; (2) smaller angular speeds; (3) greater luminance
contrasts; (4) greater distances; (5) lower eccentricity; (6) smaller angular distances
from the vanishing point of converging lines; and (7) smaller angular distances from
the focus of expansion (FoE). In what follows, I shall refer to these putative cues to
the observer’s DoM as ‘‘M-features.’’
III. Targets that have a smaller angular distance from the moving observer’s DoM will
tend to undergo: (A) greater increase in angular size; (B) greater increase in angular
speed; (C) greater decrease in luminance contrast; and (D) greater decrease in
distance.
IV. Combining ‘‘DoM’’ regularities 1–7 in (II) and ‘‘rate of change’’ regularities A–D in
(III) results in 28 higher-order regularities, 1A–7D, concerning the way a target’s per-
ceived features change during forward motion as a function of its angular distance
from the DoM. For example, combining regularities 1 and A yields regularity 1A:
‘‘A region of the visual field with smaller angular sizes tends to undergo in the next
moment a greater increase in angular size.’’
V. Visual illusions arise when a stationary observer is presented with a stimulus contain-
ing one or more of the M-features mentioned in (II). In such a case, the stimulus
‘‘tricks’’ the visual system into thinking that the observer is moving forward and, so,
given (I), into compensating for the VPL by generating a conscious perception of the
way target would project in the next moment.2 Visual illusions are cases of ‘‘inappro-
priate’’ perceiving of the present.
VI. Last, to each of the 28 empirical regularities mentioned in (IV) there corresponds
a predicted class of visual illusions (see the illusion evidence table on pp. 477–
480).
The combination of these six claims is an ambitious new theory of visual illusions moti-
vated by an impressively varied array of psychophysical evidence. Although complete,
case-by-case assessment of the way illusions are classified by Changizi et al. (2008) is obvi-
ously not possible in the space of this brief report, I raise some concerns in what follows
about the way a number of illusions are treated by the proposed systematization.3 I also pose
two general problems—one empirical and one conceptual—for the PTP approach. I begin
with these in the next section.
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2. M-features and direction of movement
Changizi et al. (2008) point out that DoM regularities 2, 3, 5, 6 will not necessarily obtain
unless it can be assumed that forward-moving observers tend to fixate on objects near the
DoM (p. 466).4 This assumption, however, seems quite questionable. For example, when
traversing a forest trail, or a city sidewalk, or even an empty beach, our eyes and head move
continuously, and the direction of gaze seems only intermittently to correspond to the DoM
(Bruce, Greene, & Georgeson, 2003, p. 340). The reader is invited to inspect her own
pattern of eye movements in everyday walking.
In support of the assumption that ‘‘lower eccentricity tends to correlate with heading’’
(p. 466), the authors cite studies by Wann and Swapp (2000) and Wilkie and Wann (2003).
These studies, however, do not deal with the pattern of fixation in low-velocity walking, but
rather in high-velocity driving on curvilinear paths. Moreover, the studies actually found
that observers visually track points on their future path that are eccentric to their instanta-
neous DoM; that is, they found that lower eccentricity does not tend to correlate with head-
ing (also see Wann & Land, 2000 and Wilkie & Wann, 2006).
More relevant studies of visual guidance of locomotion on foot (Harris & Rogers, 1999;
Rushton & Harris, 2004; Rushton, Harris, Lloyd, & Wann, 1998) also fail to corroborate the
assumption that lower eccentricity is well correlated with heading. In particular, they pro-
vide evidence that pedestrian observers utilize the perceived, egocentric location of the tar-
get relative to the bodily midline, that is, the locomotor axis, rather than the FoE of optic
flow. In order to correct deviations in heading (reflected in target drift), walking observers
need only intermittently fixate on the intended DoM so as to align their bodily midline with
the orientation of their eyes and head. Notably, Harris and Bonas (2002) found that even
when scene structure and optic flow information are available in addition to information
about the target’s egocentric direction, visual guidance of human walking may rely only on
the egocentric direction strategy.
In addition to this empirical problem, the PTP approach also faces a conceptual problem.
Changizi et al. (2008) do not only assume that M-features mentioned in regularities 1–7 (see
II above) are cues to the direction in which a moving observer is traveling. They also assume
that each of the M-features is by itself a sufficiently reliable indicator of forward movement
that its presence in a stimulus array can cause latency correction mechanisms to generate a
perception of the next probable scene. The presence, however, of an angular size, luminance,
or velocity gradient in the visual field, as the authors themselves note (p. 467), is fully consis-
tent with stationary observation. Indeed, the majority of ecologically normal stimuli con-
fronting a stationary observer would seem to contain at least one (and usually more than one)
of the features that the authors take to indicate forward movement in a certain direction.5 In
order adaptively to interpret the presence of an M-feature as a DoM cue, then, the visual
system would seem to require independent kinaesthetic ⁄proprioceptive evidence (e.g., from
efference copy, muscle stretch, optic flow, etc.) that the observer was actually in motion. But,
if this is the case, then it seems quite implausible that illusion stimuli should, by themselves,
that is, in the absence of such additional evidence, cause the visual system to engage in
inappropriate latency correction—contrary to the PTP hypothesis.
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3. Illusions and empirical regularities 1A–7D
To each of the 28 empirical regularities (1A–7D) described by Changizi et al. (2008),
there corresponds a predicted class of visual illusions. Of the 28 predicted classes, three are
empty: 4B, 4C, and 7C. In this section, I assess the empirical tenability of the way a variety
of illusions are classified by 8 of the remaining 25 empirical regularities: 1A, 1B, 3A, 3D,
4A, 4D, 6A, and 6C. I select these examples in particular for examination because they are
among the more familiar and widely studied illusions taxonomized by the authors.
(1A) ‘‘A region of the visual field with smaller angular sizes tends to undergo in the next
moment, that is, the predicted perception is of, a greater increase in angular size.’’ Accord-
ing to the authors, 1A characterizes traditional size-contrast illusions such as the Ebbinghaus
(Titchener Circles) illusion (p. 472). There are several problems, however, with this classifi-
cation of the Ebbinghaus illusion. First, inducers with larger angular sizes in the annulus sur-
rounding the target usually result in underestimation of the target’s size. 1A does not predict
this effect—arguably one half of the illusion. Second, there is evidence that a number of
other stimulus variables besides relative size significantly contribute to the magnitude of the
illusion (Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Roberts, Harris, & Yates, 2005). These include the
completeness of the inducing annulus and the structural similarity of the inducers to the tar-
get (Choplin & Medin, 1999; Rose & Bressan, 2002). While the PTP approach presumably
predicts that increasing the distance of smaller inducers from the target should attenuate the
overestimation of the target’s apparent size (by DoM regularity 5), 1A is not consistent with
the finding that smaller inducers can actually cause underestimation of the target’s size as
distance increases (Girgus, Coren, & Agdern, 1972; Roberts et al., 2005). Recent studies by
Roberts et al. (2005), in fact, show that the general tendency of surrounding inducers is to
reduce the apparent size of the target, even when the inducers are comparatively smaller in
angular size. They conclude that the standard size-contrast interpretation of the Ebbinghaus
illusion is an oversimplification: ‘‘it would be more appropriate to conclude that inducers
generally reduce apparent target size and that small inducers are simply less effectual in
doing this’’ (Roberts et al., 2005, p. 850).6
(1B) ‘‘A region of the visual field with smaller angular sizes tends to undergo in the next
moment a greater increase in angular speed.’’ The authors here cite studies that have found
that a moving target is perceived as faster when traveling against a background with smaller
features (Brown, 1931; Gogel & McNulty, 1983; Johansson, 1950) or greater dot densities
(Watamaniuk, Grzywacz, & Yuille, 1993). It is plausible, however, that the perceived speed
of a moving target rather increases against backgrounds with greater texture densities
because such backgrounds provide more visual reference marks with which to assess rela-
tive motion (Gogel & McNulty, 1983).7 Notably, Nguyen-Tri and Faubert (2007) found that,
in contrast with static texture, the presence of dynamic texture does not increase perceived
speed. This lends support to the idea that texture must provide ‘‘reliable spatial landmarks’’
in order to produce an increase in the target’s perceived speed. Mere proximity to a back-
ground texture, as suggested by 1B, is not sufficient to produce an increase in perceived
speed. Another possibility is that the increase in perceived speed is the result of an increase
in the moving target’s visibility on textured backgrounds (Blakemore & Snowden, 2000;
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Snowden, 1997). One piece of evidence for the latter hypothesis is that changes in perceived
speed due to target contrast (the ‘‘Thompson effect’’) are eliminated when the target moves
across a textured background, but they are reinstated when the target is provided with a nar-
row, untextured alleyway over which to travel (Blakemore & Snowden, 2000). Low-contrast
targets are ‘‘corrected’’ with respect to their perceived speed, Blakemore and Snowden sug-
gest, because the background texture increases the visibility of the target’s outline. Given
the strong empirical plausibility of these theoretical alternatives, there is good reason to
think that the putative M-feature mentioned in 1B, that is, smaller angular sizes, plays a role
in causing the illusory motion effect that is independent of any statistical link between that
feature and a walking observer’s DoM.
A second problem with classification by regularity 1B is conceptual. In particular, in
cases in which a putative M-feature is a property of the surround as a whole—as in the case
of fine background texture or high dot density—there is no region of the visual field that can
be singled out by appeal to the relevant DoM regularity as the region toward which the
observer is probably moving. But this means that there is no region of the visual field that
can be nonarbitrarily singled out as the region that will undergo the changes respectively
predicted by rate-of-change correlates A–D. In the cited study by Watamaniuk et al. (1993),
for example, it was found that increasing dot density in a random dot cinematogram pro-
duced a global increase in perceived speed, that is, for the whole array. In this case, there is
neither a single region of the visual field that can be associated with the observer’s probable
DoM, nor a single region of the visual field that instances the illusory motion effect.
(3A) ‘‘A region of the visual field containing greater luminance contrasts tends to undergo
in the next moment a greater increase in angular size.’’ Box 3A of the illusion evidence table
cites studies that have found that greater luminance contrasts enhance the classical geometri-
cal illusions and that (color) equiluminance eliminates them (Lehmann, 1904; Liebmann,
1927; Livingstone & Hubel, 1987). Putting aside the objection that many geometrical
illusions involve a decrease in angular size, for example, the Ebbinghaus illusion with large
inducers or the ‘‘wings-in’’ version of the Mu¨ller–Lyer illusion, I shall merely point out here
that more recent studies have found that many geometrical illusions are robustly sustained
under equiluminance (Cavanagh, 1986, 1989; Gregory, 1977, 1979; Li & Guo, 1995).
Indeed, the most comprehensive and carefully controlled study of the issue to date by
Hamburger, Hansen, and Gegenfurtner (2007) found that nine of the best known geometric
illusions (Delboeuf, Ebbinghaus, Hering, Judd, Mu¨ller–Lyer, Poggendorff, Ponzo, Vertical,
and Zo¨llner) were as strong when presented under two different equiluminant chromatic con-
trast conditions as when presented under luminance contrast. The best current psychophysi-
cal evidence thus suggests that the class of visual illusions predicted by 3A does not exist.
(3D) ‘‘A region of the visual field containing greater luminance contrasts tends to
undergo in the next moment a greater decrease in perceived distance.’’ As an example of an
illusion falling under 3D, Changizi et al. (2008) refer to what they describe as a new illusion
predicted by the PTP approach (see the figure on p. 478). In the illusion, the left end of a
uniformly grey rectangle appears closer in depth because of the higher contrast surround on
the left. There is a more straightforward explanation of the illusory effect, however. If lumi-
nance contrast is necessary to compute depth from occlusion and, so, to segment surfaces
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located at different depths, as influentially argued by Livingstone and Hubel (1987), then
the left end of the rectangle may appear to be closer because it is perceived partially to
occlude the two darker rectangles on that side: Surfaces that are perceived as occluders
appear by definition to be closer than the surface(s) that they appear to occlude. Since the
right end of the rectangle, by contrast, is in a low-contrast region of the stimulus array, the
appearance of occlusion is much less pronounced. This parsimonious alternative explanation
would seem to obviate appeal to the putative correlation between lower luminance contrasts
and the observer’s DoM under conditions of forward locomotion.
(4A) ‘‘A region of the visual field containing greater distances from the observer tends to
undergo in the next moment a greater increase in angular size.’’ Box 4A of the illusion evi-
dence table cites studies that have found that depth information provided by stereopsis,
accommodation, and convergence can modulate perceived size. In particular, when viewing
two targets at different distances that subtend the same visual angle under reduced cue
conditions, that is, in the absence of depth information provided by perspective, texture
gradients, occlusion, shading, etc., observers paradoxically perceive the far target as both
larger and closer than the near target (Biersdorf, Ohwaki, & Kozil, 1963; Epstein, Park, &
Casey, 1961; Gogel 1978; Heinemann, Tulving, & Nachmias, 1959; Kaneko & Uchikawa,
1997; McCready, 1985; Mon-Williams & Tresilian, 1999; Ono, Muter, & Mitson, 1974).
This phenomenon is commonly known as the ‘‘size-distance paradox.’’
The increase in the target’s perceived size (in notable contrast with the decrease in its
perceived distance) in the ‘‘size-distance paradox,’’ however, is relatively unmysterious. In
fact, it can be predicted from Emmert’s law, according to which perceived size increases
with perceived distance in depth (Emmert, 1881). Under reduced cue conditions, stereopsis,
accommodation, and vergence are important cues to the distance of a binocularly viewed
target. Emmert’s law therefore predicts that increasing the target’s perceived distance by
increasing its stereoscopic-, accommodative-, or vergence-specified distance should lead to
a corresponding increase in the target’s perceived size.8 If this is the case, however, then the
correlation between the putative M-feature, that is, greater distances, and the DoM under
conditions of forward locomotion again seems extraneous to characterizing and explaining
the illusory effect in question.
(4D) ‘‘A region of the visual field containing greater distances from the observer tends to
undergo in the next moment a greater decrease in perceived distance.’’ Box 4D concerns
illusions of depth contrast, in which the perceived depth or slant of a surface is modulated
not only by binocular disparities with respect to the surface itself but also by disparities with
respect to flanking and surrounding surfaces (see Howard & Rogers, 1995 for a review).
Thus, it has been found that when a target strip in the frontal plane is presented against the
background of an inclined surface, the target appears inclined in the opposite direction, that
is, toward the observer (van Ee, Banks, & Backus, 1999; Sato & Howard, 2001; Werner,
1937). This effect has been termed ‘‘slant contrast’’ (van Ee et al., 1999).
The ‘‘slant estimation’’ theory put forward by van Ee et al. (1999), however, seems to
explain this effect quite well. The theory is premised on the idea that surface slant is com-
puted using a weighted, linear combination of various slant estimators. The target appears to
slant in the opposite direction to that of the inducer, according to the theory, because the
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absolute slant of the inducer as well as the relative slant between target surface and the indu-
cer are both estimated with greater reliability and, so, are proportionally weighted more
heavily than the absolute slant of target. One important merit of the slant-estimation theory
is that it correctly predicts that when stereo-based and perspective-based signals specifying
the inducer’s slant are mutually consistent (which is not the case when the stimulus consists
of images on a display screen, but is the case when the stimulus consists of real planes) the
slant-contrast effect will be eliminated. It also correctly predicts a reversed slant contrast
effect, that is, the target’s apparent slant in the opposite direction (away from the observer),
when the inducer’s stereo-specified slant is zero but its nonstereo-specified slant is non-zero.
Regularity 4D does not equip the PTP approach, however, to predict either of these results.
Indeed, the latter result is inconsistent with 4D.
(6A) ‘‘A region of the visual field containing smaller angular distances from the vanish-
ing point of converging lines tends to undergo in the next moment a greater increase in
angular size.’’ According to Changizi et al. (2008), empirical regularity 6A unifies a large
menagerie of classical geometrical illusions. This is decidedly the most ambitious applica-
tion of the PTP approach. In what follows, I focus in particular on the way the PTP approach
deals with the Mu¨ller–Lyer and Ponzo illusions.
One difficulty is that 6A does not predict that the central line segment in the familiar
‘‘wings-in’’ version of the Mu¨ller–Lyer stimulus will be underestimated. And it also seems
inconsistent with the observation that the central line segment is underestimated in the
‘‘wings-out’’ version when the wings are outwardly displaced (Oyama, 1960; Predebon,
1994). Another basic difficulty is that there are well-known 2-D and 3-D variants (DeLucia
& Hochberg, 1991; Nijhawan, 1991) of the Mu¨ller–Lyer stimulus that do not contain obli-
que, 2-D line segments. A rigorous theory of the Mu¨ller–Lyer illusion, as Nijhawan (1991)
has argued, ‘‘must be general enough to explain the illusion found in all of these variations,
as well as others that exist too’’ (p. 315). The PTP approach, however, is not able to account
for these variants of the Mu¨ller–Lyer illusion in terms of empirical regularity 6A.9
The PTP approach similarly presupposes that oblique, 2-D line segments in the stimulus
are necessary for the Ponzo illusion. The Ponzo illusion, however, is sustained when the
horizontal line segments are presented on a 3-D truncated pyramid, viewed from above
(Prinzmetal, Shimamura, & Mikolinski, 2001, p. 109; Rock, 1984, p. 156). It is also sus-
tained when the inducing elements are replaced with an illusory triangle (Farne`, 1968); with
two pairs of short vertical lines, one pair surrounding each horizontal bar (Fisher, 1973);
with a single, oblique line segment (Fisher, 1968a); or with a triangular arrangement of dots
(Kanizsa, 1974).10 6A, however, does not cover any of these variants of the Ponzo illusion.
Last, criticisms of the linear perspective theory of the Ponzo illusion by Prinzmetal et al.
(2001) also apply to the PTP approach. In an experiment designed to compare the predictive
merits of the linear perspective theory and the ‘‘tilt constancy’’ theory (Prinzmetal & Beck,
2001; Shimamura & Prinzmetal, 1999), Prinzmetal and co-authors devised three stimulus
conditions (Fig. 1). In all three conditions, the vertical line segments are physically identical
in length. Both the linear perspective theory and the PTP approach agree with the tilt con-
stancy theory in predicting that the vertical line on the right in Condition 1 will appear
longer in length than the vertical line on the left. This, of course, is the classical Ponzo
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illusion. In Condition 2, however, the linear perspective theory incorrectly predicts that both
lines will appear identical (since, given the perspectival depth cues, they appear equidistant
in depth), while the PTP approach incorrectly predicts that the line on the right will appear
longer (since it is closer to the putative FoE). The tilt constancy theory, by contrast,
correctly predicts that the line on the left will appear longer. Last, in Condition 3, the linear
perspective theory incorrectly predicts that the line segment on the right will appear longer
(since it now appears to be more distant in depth), as does the PTP approach (since it is
again closer to the putative FoE). The tilt constancy theory, by contrast, correctly predicts
that the lines will appear identical in length. In contrast with the tilt constancy theory, then
the PTP approach predicts the wrong result in two out of the three stimulus conditions.
(6C) ‘‘A region of the visual field containing lower angular distances from the vanishing
point of converging lines tends to undergo in the next moment a greater decrease in lumi-
nance contrast.’’ According to the authors, evidence for 6C comes from a supposedly new
illusion in which a gray square near the center of radial display on a white background
appears lighter (see the figure on p. 479). A far more straightforward explanation, however,
would advert to the high density of the radiating black lines near the center of the display.
Since the overall lightness of the background in the relevant region of the display is darker
than in more eccentric regions, the effect here seems well predicted by traditional contrast
mechanisms. I should note, in support of this alternative explanation, that a gray square
when presented against a horizontal or vertical black-and-white grating of a similar density
also appears lighter than when presented against a white background.
4. Conclusion
Changizi et al. (2008) emphasize that, in their view, the putative systematization of illu-
sions is a ‘‘more fundamental and important result’’ (p. 460) than the theoretical claim that
predicting the present, that is, the latency correction hypothesis, explains that result. They
also point out that the putative systematization does not presuppose the empirical validity of
the latency correction hypothesis. The converse, however, is not the case. The latency cor-
rection hypothesis does predict that visual illusions can be unified by regularities 1A–7D.
Fig. 1. Three stimulus conditions used in an experiment designed to compare the predictive merits of the linear
perspective theory and the tilt constancy theory. Adapted from Prinzmetal et al. (2001).
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Showing, as I have done above, that the proposed classification of illusions is implausible
(or untenable) in a variety of cases thus provides motivation for questioning the empirical
validity of the latency correction hypothesis as well.
I should mention, in closing, that the PTP approach is partly motivated by the assumption
that a VPL of 100 ms (or more) poses serious challenges to object-directed, visuomotor con-
trol during locomotion. Changizi et al. (2008) write: ‘‘consider reaching out to grab a 1-m
distant object translating in front of an observer at 1 m ⁄ s; if an observer did not have percep-
tual compensation mechanisms, then by the time he perceives the object, the object will be
roughly 6 displaced from its perceived position, making it nearly impossible to plan and
execute appropriate behavioral reaching for a catch…. In short, we should expect that visual
systems have been selected to ‘perceive the present,’ rather than to perceive the recent past’’
(p. 460). It is not clearly evident, however, that in order to act in the present it is necessary
consciously to perceive the present. As Nijhawan (2008) emphasizes, ‘‘sensory-motor pro-
cesses are certainly capable of compensating for all the delays in the sensorimotor loop,
including those incurred by visual processes per se’’ (p. 184). This point aside, there is also
a wealth of evidence that rapid and accurate visuomotor planning is possible without the
involvement of processing pathways devoted to conscious vision (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003;
Koch, 2004; Milner & Goodale, 1995 ⁄2006). Moving observers, in short, may adaptively
cope with approaching objects even though they do not consciously perceive them at the
time action is initiated. Last, there is neuropsychological evidence that the representation of
a target’s direction of movement in visual area MT lags behind the stimulus by approxi-
mately 45 ms (Krekelberg, 2008). Since neural activity in MT is reliably correlated with
perceived motion, even when motion is illusory (Krekelberg, Dannenberg, Hoffmann,
Bremmer, & Ross, 2003; Krekelberg, van Wezel, & Albright, 2006; Schlack & Albright,
2007), this suggests that ‘‘while we may act in the present, we perceive the past’’
(Krekelberg, 2008, p. 209).11
Notes
1. For an attempt at classification that accords with the fox’s assumptions, see Gregory
(1997, 2005). Gregory proposes that illusions can be classified along two main
dimensions of variation, ‘‘appearance’’ and ‘‘cause.’’ Classification along the first
dimension depends on whether an illusion is characterized by what he terms ambigu-
ity, distortion, paradox, or fiction. Classification along the second dimension depends
on whether an illusion has a physical etiology, for example, a disturbance at the
optical level, or a cognitive etiology, for example, a misapplication of a general rule
of visual information processing. The main point is that even when a visual illusion
has been classified using Gregory’s taxonomy, there is still room for significant
variation at the level of underlying mechanism.
2. Correctly estimating the length of the VPL in human subjects is of clear importance,
since the longer the latency, the greater the perceptual compensation that should be
required—and, hence, the greater the magnitude of predicted illusory effects when
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perceiving the present (PTP) is inappropriate. Changizi et al. (2008) assume that the
VPL is 100 ms, while Changizi (2001) assumes a much shorter VPL of 50 ms.
Recent neuropsychological evidence, however, suggests that recurrent processing
occurring at latencies significantly greater than 100 ms may often be necessary for
conscious visual awareness (Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008; Lamme, 2003,
2006). There is also evidence, notably, that certain illusions of angular size may
depend on feedback of 3-D, contextual information from higher-level visual areas to
V1 (Fang, Boyaci, Kersten, & Murray, 2008; Murray, Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006).
There is a question, then, given what is possibly a much longer VPL, whether the
magnitude of illusory effects predicted by the PTP approach is commensurate with
the magnitude of illusory effects actually observed for relevant stimuli.
3. The goal of systematic classification in any domain of inquiry is to achieve an order-
ing of things into kinds (and subkinds) that facilitates new explanations, predictions,
comparisons, and theories. While it seems fair to say that vision science has histori-
cally had more success in discovering visual illusions than in organizing them in a
theoretically productive manner, I should emphasize that nothing I say here should
be taken to invite general skepticism about efforts in this direction.
4. Nor will Correlate 7.
5. Hence, the question arises why, if the PTP theory is correct, illusions are not rife in
ordinary visual experience.
6. The exception, Roberts et al. (2005) observe, is at shorter distances (<3.5 deg),
where smaller inducers and complete annuli resulted in an overestimation of the
target’s size.
7. Gogel and McNulty (1983) also suggest that increasing reference mark density
increases the apparent distance between reference points. In consequence, moving
stimuli are perceived to travel a greater distance over more densely referenced areas
and, hence, to be traveling faster.
8. One surprising example of this effect is that moving one’s arm backwards and
forwards in the dark can influence the vergence angle of the eyes and thereby dramat-
ically modulate the size of an afterimage of one’s unseen hand (Mon-Williams,
Tresilian, Plooy, Wann, & Broerse, 1997).
9. Nijhawan (1991), I should mention, provides compelling evidence that common
causal mechanisms underlie both the classical 2-D and 3-D versions of the illusion.
This means that it is not open to proponents of the PTP approach to claim that PTP is
an adequate theory of the classical, 2-D version of the illusion. The same illusion
plausibly arises in both the 2-D and 3-D case.
10. The latency correction approach suggests that the classical geometrical illusions have
a common etiology. Prinzmetal et al. (2001), however, provide reasons to think that
the underlying mechanisms of the Mu¨ller–Lyer and the Ponzo illusion are unrelated.
First, the angle between the components differently affects the two illusions. While
the strength of the effect in the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion tends to increase monotonically
as the angle between components becomes more acute, the strength of the effect in
the Ponzo illusion first increases, then decreases as the angle between components
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becomes more acute (Coren & Girgus, 1978; Fisher, 1968b, 1973). Second, Prinz-
metal and Beck (2001) found that tilting observers increased the Ponzo (as well as
the Zo¨llner and Poggendorff) illusion, but did not affect the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion.
11. I am grateful to three anonymous referees for detailed comments that resulted in sig-
nificant improvements of this brief report. Thanks also to Phil Ehrlich, Mark LeBar,
Lisa Mosier, and Wendy Parker for help and encouragement.
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